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In the early days of January 2011, delivering on a promise from the
Republican Pledge to America,1 the U.S. House of Representatives amended
House Rule XII to require that "all measures introduced in the House ... that
are intended to become law"2 must be accompanied by a document citing "as
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the
Constitution to enact the" proposed measure.3 In its entirety, the new rule reads:
7(c)(1) A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless the sponsor
submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement citing as
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the
Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution. The statement shall appear in a
portion of the Record designated for that purpose and be made publicly
available in electronic form by the Clerk.
(2) Before consideration of a Senate bill or joint resolution, the chair of a
committee of jurisdiction may submit the statement required under
subparagraph (1) as though the chair were the sponsor of the Senate bill or
joint resolution.4
Shortly after the adoption of this new Rule, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) issued an important report providing, among other things,
guidance about its scope. 5 Some items were pure housekeeping. The CRS
Report, for instance, restates and clarifies some of the limits of the plain text of
the new Rule. As the Report highlights, the new Rule applies its mandatory
obligations only to new bills and joint resolutions proposed in the House.6 It is,
by contrast, permissive where a Senate bill or joint resolution is taken up,
allowing, but not requiring, "the chair of a committee of jurisdiction" to submit
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4 1d.
5 THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 1.6 1d.
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the required statement "as though the chair were the sponsor of the Senate"
measure?
Among the subtler issues the CRS Report addresses is a crucial feature of
the reach of the new Rule. As interpreted in the CRS Report, the Rule
incorporates a distinction between what the Report dubs "statements of
constitutional authority" and "analys[e]s of constitutionality. '8 "Statements of
constitutional authority," says the Report, are required where the new Rule
applies,9 while "analys[e]s of constitutionality" are not.10
The particular terminology of this distinction may be unfamiliar (it is not
found in the text of the new Rule), but the distinction itself, with a little
explanation, is easily understood. The CRS Report reads the House Rule to
require only a statement referring to
the provision or clause of the Constitution that grants Congress the authority to
enact the bill that is being introduced. Phrased another way, the question that
the House rule is arguably asking of members is, what part of the Constitution
gives Congress the power to act in the manner being proposed.I I
The articulation of that foundation comprises the sum and substance of the
"statement of constitutional authority" said to be required by the new Rule. By
negative implication, according to the CRS Report, what "[t]he [new House]
rule does not appear to be asking [is] whether the specifics of what the member
is proposing in [a] bill [or joint resolution] are consistent with the Constitution"
in any other sense.12 To determine whether a particular bill or joint resolution is
or is not ultimately consistent with the Constitution, the Report explains, would
require an "analysis of constitutionality," which is "a separate, often times much
more complex inquiry" than what the new Rule contemplates. 13 This is because
a full constitutional work-up would presumably entail consideration of whether
''particular components of the [proposed] legislation are in fact constitutionally
permissible in light of provisions in the Constitution that may place limitations
or disabilities on Congress's authority to act." 14
Borrowing an example from the CRS Report in order to put some additional
flesh on its distinction between "statements of constitutional authority" and
"analyses of constitutionality," the new House Rule would appear satisfied in
7Id.
8 See id. at 2-4.
9 Id. at 2-3.
10 1d. at 3.
11 THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14d. There is certainly something to this, though questions of congressional authority,
aside from disabilities or limitations on congressional powers, are not always either as
simple or straightforward as the contrast in this example could be taken to suggest. For
gestures in the CRS Report toward some of the complications, see id. at 3-4 (discussing the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)).
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the case of a new bill introduced in the House relating to "the interstate sale and
distribution of material related to animal cruelty or depictions of child
pornography"' 5 when the bill's sponsor submits a "statement of constitutional
authority" citing the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as the basis for
this would-be exercise of legislative power. 16 That, the authors of the CRS
report think, is all it takes. By extension, the Rule appears to demand no
additional analysis of whether the proposed legislative measure conflicts with,
for example, the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.
Finishing the point, the CRS Report announces in general terms that:
The consideration of constitutional limitations or disabilities on Congress's
authority, such as the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, appears to be
outside the scope of the House rule. The House rule arguably only requires the
members to state the constitutional basis for authority to act, not whether the
action is constitutionally permissible in light of other potentially disabling or
limiting provisions. 1 7
Once the distinction between "statements of constitutional authority" and
"analyses of constitutionality" is understood, it is possible to begin generating
defenses of it. After all, in some sense it functionally traces a standard
distinction every student of American constitutional law learns: Congress, being
within our system an institution of enumerated, hence limited, powers, every
legislative action it undertakes must be supported by some affirmative grant of
constitutional authority-whether express or implied. 18 The new House Rule
simply calls for this affirmative grant of authority to be specifically referred to
in a special document, now being collected and published in the Congressional
Record. The statement the Rule requires need not also include a discussion of
whether a proposed bill or joint resolution originating in the House, if passed
pursuant to some affirmative grant of enumerated constitutional powers,
nevertheless would violate some other constitutional limitation or prohibition,
hence whether the courts will ultimately uphold or strike it down if and when
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Beyond the generally familiar dimensions of the distinction, there are more
particular and powerful reasons for reading the new House Rule the way the
15Id.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17 THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
18 See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("We admit, as
all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be
transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers
are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties
assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.").
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CRS Report does. Among other things, the CRS's understanding of the new
Rule minimizes the burdens it adds to the legislative process. Comparatively, it
generally seems easier, not to mention quicker, to cite a constitutional provision
or even multiple constitutional provisions that would seem to authorize a
particular piece of legislative action than to engage in a full-blown analysis of
the constitutionality of a proposed (or more exactly, a to-be-proposed)
legislative measure that might, to be complete, have to consider all the
reasonable constitutional arguments for and against it. If not checked in the
ways the CRS Report proposes, the new Rule might become quite expensive in
terms of the institutional resources it consumes. As the CRS Report notes, the
Clerk of the House "appears to have the authority to reject" 19 new bills or joint
resolutions that fail to supply the required "statement of constitutionality." 20
Merits aside, if the statement required full-blown constitutional analysis of each
and every proposed measure, when and how, and based on what, would the
Clerk (or her staff) know enough was enough? How would the Clerk (or her
staff) vet the analysis submitted? Would any constitutional analysis, however
idiosyncratic, perfunctory, or unpersuasive, be held to suffice?21
19 THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
20 Id.
2 1 Now, anyway, it may be. Id. ("[T]he rule does not appear to vest the House Clerk
with the responsibility or authority to evaluate the substantiality of the required statement.");
id. at 2 ("The rule appears to adopt a subjective standard for determining what specific
constitutional authority exists to enact an introduced bill."). At this point in the Rule's
operation, any citation appears to suffice, even when it runs to sources not conventionally
seen as granting Congress direct legislative powers. See id. (providing a sampling of
"permissible sources for members to rely on," which includes "James Madison's Notes on
the Constitutional Convention of 1787[,] ... the Federalist Papers, Anti-Federalist
Papers,... Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States or The
Heritage Guide to the Constitution; academic journal articles, constitutional law treatises,
and other publications"). At most, these sources seem relevant for the light they help shed on
what the Constitution means. For examples of statements of constitutional authority that
appear to do the job, if somewhat subjectively, see 157 CONG. REc. H44 (daily ed. Jan. 5,
2011) (statement of Rep. Bachmann) ("Congress has the power to enact this legislation
[H.R. 87] pursuant to the following: This bill makes specific changes to existing law in a
manner that returns power to the States and to People, in accordance with Amendment X to
the U.S. Constitution."); id. at H45 (statement of Rep. Holt) ("Congress has the power to
enact this legislation [H.R. 131] pursuant to the following: Article I of the Constitution of
the United States."); id. at H46 (statement of Rep. Paul) ("Congress has the power to enact
this legislation [H.R. 151] pursuant to the following: The constitutionality of the seniors'
Health Care Freedom Act is the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
protects American citizens from having their rights to life, liberty or property abridged
without due process of law. Forcing seniors into a federal program they do not want, and
fording them from forming private contracts, violates their right to liberty and property.");
id. at H396 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) (statement of Rep. Pitts) ("Congress has the power to
enact this legislation [H.R. 358] pursuant to the following: The Protect Life Act would
overturn an unconstitutional mandate regarding abortion in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act."); id. at H51 1 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2011) (statement of Rep. Deutch)
("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 484] pursuant to the following: The
[Vol. 72:61320
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And there are other considerations that recommend the CRS's reading of
the new House Rule as requiring only statements-not analyses--of
constitutional authority. The CRS's reading shows a marked tendency to
preserve a well-established division of responsibility between Congress and the
courts in our constitutional scheme. Consistent with this traditional view,
Congress makes the laws that the courts interpret and review for constitutional
conformity. 22 The CRS's understanding of the new House Rule keeps the
allocation of tasks largely, if not entirely, intact. Pursuant to the new House
Rule, while the sponsor of a new bill or joint resolution originating in the House
must submit the required constitutional authorization statement, the House itself
is not ordered to make any collective judgment about it. Institutionally, the
obligation to assess constitutionality-both Congress's authority to pass a
particular piece of legislation, as well as its conformity with the cited provision
and the remainder of the Constitution-remains fully docked at the courts. Nor
does the new House Rule by its terms purport to tell the courts how they ought
to treat the statements it requires. Courts might give them some heed or dismiss
them entirely-whatever the courts decide. 23 Understood this way, the new
First Amendment of the United States Constitution."); id. at H1363 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011)
(statement of Rep. Kucinich) ("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 808]
pursuant to the following: The preamble to the Constitution has the following injunction:
I ... to promote domestic tranquility... [.]' This is the purpose of the bill."); id. at H3219
(daily ed. May 11, 2011) (statement of Rep. Paul) ("Congress has the power to enact this
legislation [H.R. 1831] pursuant to the following: This act is justified by the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution that, by granting Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the several states, allows Congress to prevent the federal government from
interfering in Americans' ability to grow and process industrial hemp and by the Ninth
Amendment and Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution that recognizes that
rights and powers are retained and reserved by the people and the states."); id at H4328
(daily ed. June 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. Polis) ("Congress has the power to enact this
legislation (H.R. 2211] pursuant to the following: Article 1, Section 1. All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives."); id. at H4749 (daily ed. July 7, 2011) (statement of
Rep. Cravaack) ("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 2442] pursuant to
the following: This bill is enacted pursuant to Amendment X of the Constitution of the
United States.").
2 2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), is, of course, a conventional
source citation for the view, though authorities reflecting the idea are legion. But see JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4 (1980) ("Of
course courts make law all the time[.] . . . [O]utside ... constitutional adjudication, they are
either filling in gaps the legislature has left in the laws it has passed or, perhaps, taking
charge of an entire area the legislature has left to judicial development."); cf id. at 131 ("In
theory it is the legislature that makes the laws and the administrators who apply them.
Anyone who has seen Congress in action, however.., will know that the actual situation is
very nearly upside down.").
23 Cf THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that upon inclusion of a
statement of constitutional authority, "the rule is satisfied and members have no legal or
procedural recourse against a statement, even if they believe the constitutional authority
statement is incomplete, inaccurate, or improper").
13212011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
House Rule mounts no challenge to the notion that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the [courts] to say what the law [(including constitutional
law)] is,"24 capped, since Marbury v. Madison and more recently Cooper v.
Aaron, by what the Court says being the final say.25
But as persuasive as the CRS's reading of the new House Rule is, and
notwithstanding the defenses of it that can readily be produced, it is anything
but the only way the Rule may be interpreted. To its credit, the CRS Report
carefully flags and effectively concedes this point in various ways. When
offering its reading, it repeatedly emphasizes that its understanding is only what
the Rule "appears" or "arguably" or "could" or "may" be understood-not what
it absolutely and unequivocally must be understood-to mean. 26
How else might the House Rule be understood? Begin, as the Rule's text
itself suggests, with the concern about "the power or powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution to enact" legislation that animates it.27 Given this
concern, it might well be regarded as useful, if not more (something akin to
indispensable), to know just how far Congress's constitutional powers go in
relation to a particular bill or joint resolution. And to know that, of course, one
might like to know more than simply what provision or provisions of the
Constitution might initially seem to justify a particular piece of proposed
legislation as a legitimate exercise of Congress's constitutional powers. One
might also like to know, for instance, whether and how Congress's powers have
been amplified or limited, whether internally or in relation to the balance of the
Constitution's text.28
If so, the CRS Report's distinction between "statements of constitutional
authority" and "analyses of constitutionality," however sensible and well
intentioned, seems slightly off the mark. If the new House Rule means to
deliver some assurances that Congress has the power to enact a particular
measure, statements of constitutional authority may be partial or incomplete-
24 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
25 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("This decision [in Marbury] declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.").
26 THOMAs & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 1 ("the House Clerk appears to have the
authority," "rule does not appear to vest," "it appears that these statements," "the rule
appears to only apply"); id. at 2 ("there appears to be nothing that prevents," "rule appears to
adopt a subjective standard," "the rule appears to leave each individual," "that appears to be
permissible," "permissible sources for members to rely on could include," "language 'as
specifically as practicable' suggests," "rule does not appear to," "the Clerk appears to have
the ability," "authority does not appear to provide"); id. at 3 ("House rule is arguably
asking," "rule does not appear to be asking," "appears to fully satisfy," "appears to be
outside the scope," "House rule arguably only requires," "Congress may be able to rely").
27 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (as passed by House, Jan. 5, 2011).
28
"Internal limitations" are actively imagined here to be internal to a cited
constitutional provision and in contradistinction to external limitations found elsewhere in
the Constitution's text.
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certainly, sometimes they will be-without any analysis of the measure's
constitutionality. A statement of constitutional authority, without more, may-
and in some instances, will-thus be insufficient, or worse: misleading, making
it seem as though Congress has the constitutional authority to enact a particular
bill or joint resolution when it, in fact, does not.29
To see why this is so, imagine a proposed bill in the House that cites the
Commerce Clause in its statement of constitutional authority even though, by
all reasonable agreement, the proposal exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause
powers read in light of the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. 30 A
citation to the Commerce Clause under these circumstances would appear to be
the emptiest way of satisfying the new House Rule, elevating form over
substance, and for what? Where is the respect for the metes and bounds of
Congress's constitutional powers in that? Or think of a House bill proposing to
ban the burning of American flags that have been part of interstate commerce.
Would a simple cite to the Commerce Clause be enough to acknowledge the
existing limits of Congress's authority to enact this legislation?31 If the new
House Rule is to be taken seriously-as its status as a House Rule suggests it
ought to be-shouldn't some reference to the First Amendment also be made,
suggesting that the proposed legislation can be squared with it, and maybe a few
words at least about how?
Stepping back from these examples, it appears that for statements of
constitutional authority to be a meaningful exercise in the direction of getting
Congress to take its constitutional obligations-including the constitutional
limitations on its powers-to heart, a statement of constitutional authority, at
least sometimes, should include some account, however brief, of how
Congress's power to enact a particular bill or joint resolution actually supports
the measure at hand-an account that may, however fleetingly, have to engage
the complex fabric of both the internal and the external limitations on
Congress's enumerated powers. But when that is what a statement of
constitutional authority looks like and does, it can no longer be neatly
distinguished from an analysis of constitutionality, because that is, in effect,
what it will have become.
It is no small matter nor is it any coincidence that a broader and more
ambitious interpretation of the new House Rule, according to which it may, at
least sometimes if not always, require an analysis of constitutionality, can with
little effort be squared with the Republican Pledge to America that helped bring
the Rule about. According to its terms, the Republican Pledge was not so much
aimed at preserving the congressional status quo as it was aimed at changing it,
29 It is true that this may be just a sponsor's view, but the capacity of a statement of
constitutional authority to produce these effects remains.
30U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
31 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (declaring expressive physical
desecration of the U.S. flag protected by the First Amendment); see also United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (invalidating the Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, as inconsistent with the First Amendment).
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minimally in the following, relevant respect. "For too long, '32 the Pledge
trumpets:
Congress has ignored the proper limits imposed by the Constitution on the
federal government. Further, it has too often drafted unclear and muddled laws,
leaving to an unelected judiciary the power to interpret what the law means and
by what authority the law stands. This lack of respect for the clear
Constitutional limits and authorities has allowed Congress to create ineffective
and costly programs that add to the massive deficit year after year. We will
require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause citing the
specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.33
Crediting these sentiments, rather than treating them as political pablum (as
many have 34), the requirement contemplated by the Pledge to America-to
"require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause citing the
specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified" 35-is driven by
a conviction that Congress has not taken the constitutional limits on its powers
seriously enough. This failure is demonstrated by the ways in which Congress
has too often left it to "an unelected judiciary" 36 to determine, among other
things, "by what authority" 37 a "law [Congress has passed] stands. '38 This
abdication of responsibility by Congress, the Pledge promises, is to come to an
end. The new House Rule is supposed to help deliver on that.
This being the case, the new House Rule might be thought better-suited to
helping achieve these larger purposes if it were not understood as only requiring
references to the sources of constitutional authority for legislative actions, but
also, where appropriate, to demand some statement, however brief and to the
point, analyzing their constitutionality. Reading the CRS Report, and recalling
that the Pledge to America was meant to appeal to not only a few Tea Partiers39
and other Tenthers 40 in the Republican crowd, it has to be regarded as
something of a defeat for them to encounter the CRS's conclusion that citations
32 Pledge to America, supra note 1, at 33.
3 3 Id.
34 See infra notes 48-50.
3 5 Pledge to America, supra note 1, at 33.
361d.
37Id.
381d.
39See About Tea Party Patriots: Our Mission, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS,
http://www.teapartypatriots.org/about (last visited Nov. 21, 2011); TEA PARTY.NET,
http://www.theteaparty.net (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
4 0 See About the Tenth Amendment Center, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR.,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2011) (describing the
Tenther movement); see also, e.g., Ed Homick, 'Tenther' Movement Aims to Put Power
Back in States' Hands, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
POLITICS/02/10/tenth.amendment.movement/index.html?iref=-allsearch.
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to the Tenth Amendment are outside the new House Rule's reach, 41 because
that Amendment is, if anything, a limitation on, not a source of, congressional
powers.
Arguably, then, the CRS's understanding of the new House Rule, which has
been widely though not universally accepted as a matter of congressional
practice, 42 gets its normative inflection wrong, and perhaps somewhat
backward. Consistent with the CRS's reading, statements of constitutional
authority submitted pursuant to the new House Rule are to focus all their
attention only on those constitutional provisions authorizing congressional
actions, and not on any provision that would circumscribe Congress's powers.
This, when the point of bringing the new Rule into being was, in part, to raise
congressional consciousness about the limits of its constitutional authority. A
broad interpretation of the new House Rule--one that does not exclude, but
includes constitutional analyses of proposed legislation, at least where
constitutional arguments are reasonably predictable, given existing
constitutional rules-thus appears better to serve the purpose of encouraging
Congress to constrain itself by "adher[ing] to the Constitution,"43 paying its
limitations their due respects, in just the ways the Pledge to America pledged. 44
41 THOMAS & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 3. Disappointing for some, but not all. Not
everyone has been daunted. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H44 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011)
(statement of Rep. Bachmann); id. at H3109 (daily ed. May 5, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Garrett); id. at H3219 (daily ed. May 11, 2011) (statement of Rep. Paul); id. at H4749 (daily
ed. July 7, 2011) (statement of Rep. Cravaack); id. at H5936 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 2011)
(statement of Rep. Quayle); id. at H6181 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Culberson); id. at H6272 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2011) (statement of Rep. Matheson); id. at
H6921 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 2011) (statement of Rep. Garrett).
42
see, e.g., 157 CoNG. REc. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Rep. McIntyre)
("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 27] pursuant to the following:
Article I, Section 8. Clause 3 of the United States Constitution."); id at H43 (statement of
Rep. Conyers) ("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 40] pursuant to the
following: Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Congress shall have the power to enact appropriate laws protecting the civil
rights of all Americans."); id. at H44 (statement of Rep. Blackburn) ("Congress has the
power to enact this legislation [H.R. 102] pursuant to the following: Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 .. "); id. (statement of Rep. Burton)
("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 105] pursuant to the following:
Clause 1, Clause 3, and Clause 18 of Section 8 and Clause 7 of Section 9 of Article I of the
United States Constitution and Amendment XVI of the United States Constitution."); id. at
H202 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2011) (statement of Rep. Norton) ("Congress has the power to enact
this legislation [H.R. 265] pursuant to the following: Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 of the
Constitution.").
4 3 Pledge to America, supra note 1, at 33.
44 Though referred to here as a "broad interpretation of the new House Rule," this
characterization is relative to the narrower reading urged by the CRS Report. An even
broader reading of the new House Rule might always require some analysis of
constitutionality.
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Of course, interpreted this way, the new House Rule would be considerably
more far-reaching than it is in the pages of the CRS Report, or, for that matter,
what actual congressional practice with it has generally been.45 Just so,
understood this way, the new Rule could be an effective starting point for a
substantially new way for the House, and perhaps for Congress as a whole, to
undertake its legislative business. 46 If one can conceive of it, congressional
deliberations on the merits of proposed legislation might not or might no longer
be, as they now are, so regularly focused on first-order policy arguments. To
pass muster in the House, proposed legislation might, before too long, also have
to satisfy the House's, if not also the Senate's, institutional judgment about the
policy options the Constitution allows, or maybe even in some instances,
requires, Congress to avail itself of.4 7
45 Compare sources cited supra note 42, with sources cited infra note 47.
4 6 Though one could imagine a rule similar to the new House Rule being adopted by the
Senate, there is no reason its operation there would have to be the same as in the House. It is
possible to imagine, for instance, the House Rule carrying the meaning of it found in the
pages of the CRS Report, while in the Senate, the broader and more ambitious reading being
discussed here might prevail.
47 For some statements made pursuant to the new House Rule that may begin to move
in these directions, see 157 CONG. REc. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Garret) ("Congress has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 21] pursuant to the
following: This bill seeks to strike a provision from the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, the so-called 'individual mandate,' which is unconstitutional. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act requires individuals to purchase private health
insurance-health insurance that has been approved by the federal government-or pay a
fine. While Congress is granted the authority to 'regulate commerce... among the several
states,' and the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to regulate and prohibit 'economic'
activities that are not, strictly speaking, commerce, this is the first time in our nation's
history that Congress has sought to regulate inactivity. And for the first time, Congress has
mandated that individuals purchase a private good, approved by the government, as the price
of citizenship. This requirement is plainly unconstitutional, and, as Federal District Court
Judge Henry Hudson recently wrote in his opinion striking down the individual mandate, 'is
beyond the historical reach of the Commerce Clause."' (omission in original)); id. at H470
(daily ed. Jan. 25, 2011) (statement of Rep. Price) ("Congress has the power to enact this
legislation [H.R. 414] pursuant to the following: Congressional power to provide for public
financing of presidential campaigns arises under the General Welfare Clause, Art. I, Sec. 8,
of the Constitution. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld
the congressional power to enact public financing of presidential elections under this Clause.
The Supreme Court stated [this] with regard to the provisions in the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 establishing a presidential public financing
system .. "); id. at H681-82 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2011) (statement of Rep. Rush) ("Congress
has the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 611] pursuant to the following: [']The Congress
shall have Power [... ] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes.['] U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3. More specifically, the
Interstate Commerce Clause-the second of the three enumerated commerce clause powers
that the Constitution confers upon Congress-serves as the constitutional basis for this
legislation. Further, per the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965), the Court held that the Constitution protects an individual's right to privacy, which is
contained in the 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of other constitutional protections. Three of
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At this point in the discussion, the new House Rule, no longer subject to
dismissal as an empty partisan gesture,48 mere symbolism, 49 nor simply a
the concurrences to the majority Griswold opinion based the right to privacy on both the
Ninth Amendment and the due process clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding
such support in the Fourteenth Amendment is notable, in part, as at least ten (10) states (AL,
AZ, CA, FL, HI, IL, LA, MO, SC, WA) expressly recognize a person's right to privacy in
their own state constitutions. Elected federal public officials, federal and state policy makers,
industry, consumer and privacy advocacy groups all agree that personal privacy of consumer
information must be protected in order for e-commerce business models and businesses (in
particular), which make use of Internet- and intranet-based platforms and networks to be
successful and sustainable.").
48 Van Hollen Blasts House Republicans for Breaking Another 'Pledge' "We Will
Require that Every Bill Contain a Citation of Constitutional Authority. We Will Give All
Representatives and Citizens at Least Three Days to Read the Bill Before a Vote. "[A Pledge
to America], STATES NEWS SERV., Sept. 29, 2010 ("House Republicans promised in their
'Pledge to America' that they would do two things procedurally-allow the American
people to see legislation 72 hours prior to a vote and include a citation of Constitutional
authority in all legislation. But today they made public a 21 page motion to recommit to the
9/11 Health and Compensation Act less than an hour before a vote, and it contains no
reference to Constitutional authority. This is just more of the same from Washington
Republicans, who are apparently more concerned with scoring partisan political points than
keeping their promises to the American people."); cf Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Ranking Member, Energy & Commerce Comm., and Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking
Member, Health Subcomm., to Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, Comm. on Energy &
Conunerce (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.
php?q=news/Waxman-and-pallone-urge-upton-not-to-consider-hr-358-until-it-includes-
citation-of-constitution, reprinted in Waxman and Pallone Urge Upton Not to Consider
H.R. 358 Until It Includes Proper Citation of Constitutional Authority, STATES NEWS SERV.,
Feb. 11, 2011 ("This bill, which is an attack on a woman's right to choose, was introduced
without a valid statement of constitutional authority as required under the new House rules
adopted in January. We respectfully urge that the bill not be considered in Committee unless
it is re-introduced with a proper citation of constitutional authority.... We do not dispute
Chairman Pitts's ruling or the parliamentary advice you gave him. But we believe that if the
Committee adheres to this policy, it will make a mockery of the rule requiring submission of
a statement of constitutional authority. According to the Parliamentarians, the chair judges
only whether a constitutional statement has been submitted at the time of introduction, not
whether the statement is valid. If members cannot raise a point of order to enforce the
constitutional statement rule during committee consideration of the rule, there is no point at
which the rule can be enforced. Chairman Pitts's bill is an assault on a woman's access to
abortion services. Its apparent objective is to make it impossible for women to choose an
abortion by effectively eliminating coverage for the necessary medical services. It also calls
into question the obligation of health care providers to provide the emergency services
needed to save the life of a pregnant woman. Because the bill represents a federal intrusion
into the most intimate personal decisions of women and families, it is exactly the type of
legislation that most needs a clear statement of Congress's constitutional authority. While
we do not dispute that you have the right to bring H.R. 358 before the full Committee, we
respectfully suggest that you use your discretion not to do so. You should ask Mr. Pitts to
introduce a new bill with a valid statement of constitutional authority and use the new bill,
not H.R. 358, as the vehicle for any further consideration of this matter in the Committee.
That would send a strong signal that the Committee is serious about the requirement that the
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joke,50 might begin to engender some determined opposition. From a certain
vantage point, a broad reading of the House Rule might appear to drive in the
direction of testing separation of powers ideals, with the House, if not the whole
Congress, performing the analytic and adjudicative functions of constitutional
review conventionally associated in our legal system with the courts. 51 The
more the House, or more, Congress as a whole, undertakes to make concrete,
independent judgments about the constitutionality of its actions, the more it may
be seen to intrude into, and even to pressure, maybe even threaten to supplant,
the constitutional prerogatives and authority of the judicial department. 52 All the
more so given that congressional judgments about constitutionality and
constitutional analysis are ostensibly backed by what might loosely be deemed
constitutional basis of legislation be clearly stated before legislation can be considered in
Committee.").4 9 Abby Brownback & Louis Jacobson, Lawmakers Abiding by New Constitutional-
Justification Rule, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 18, 2001), http://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/promises/gop-pledge-o-meter/promise/665/require-bills-to-include-a-clause-citing-
its-autho/ ("So Republicans and Democrats are following the new rule. But has there been
any impact on how the House operates? Experts in congressional procedure say the impact is
only symbolic. They agreed that the Republicans have kept their promise, even in judgment-
call cases like Pitts' justification. But the experts added that they didn't think statements like
these are especially meaningful, since the justifications-like many arguments about the
Constitution itself-are matters of interpretation. 'Frankly, this is just symbolic, so I have no
real feelings one way or the other,' said Norman Ornstein, a congressional scholar at the
conservative American Enterprise Institute. 'Of course, you could offer a bill that repeals the
Internal Revenue Code, or Medicare, by claiming it is unconstitutional as your basis, and be
utterly wrong. But what difference does it really make? You can also justify almost any bill
you want by claiming a broad constitutional authority under the health and welfare clause or
the commerce clause. So I see the disagreements here as being just as symbolic as the
promise in the first place."').
5°David Weigel, Because We Say So: How Republicans Are Explaining the
Constitutionality of Every Bill They Introduce, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2011, 7:46 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2289166/ (quoting Sandy Levinson saying "[n]o lawyer takes this
seriously").
51 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "Might appear," of course,
because each branch of government is within its rights, even obligations, to assess the
constitutionality of its own actions. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3-4, at 264-67 (3d ed. 2000); see also, e.g., Letter from Eric J. Holder, Jr., Att'y
Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011)
(concluding unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006))).
52 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BAR ON POLITICS 263 (Yale Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) ("Mr. Vinson and others could urge also that constitutional
decision is the province of the Court, which Congress should not usurp by voting this bill
down on the basis of its own view of its unconstitutionality."). To be clear, this is not an
affirmative argument for this position, only a distillation of a particular logic associated with
conventional ideals ofjudicial review.
[Vol. 72:61328
HOUSE RULE XII
democratic bona fides.53 Should these judgments embrace the rules of reason
and principles laid down in Supreme Court precedents, 54 picking up, for
instance, where Supreme Court doctrines, as they exist, leave off, and engaging
the same methods of reasoning and reason-giving followed by the Court, by
what authority could the Court challenge or supplant them? At the very least,
these congressional judgments of constitutionality coming from a co-equal
branch of government would look to be entitled to some degree of deference
and respect.55 It is one thing, after all, for the courts to make judgments of
constitutionality when Congress does not, or, when it does, when Congress has
simply been guessing about what the courts are likely to do.56 It is not obvious
why courts should defer to legislative assessments about what they will do
rather than simply doing what they will. But it would be something else again
for the courts, including the Supreme Court, to substitute their judgments for
Congress's where Congress has made a considered constitutional judgment for
itself, particularly if it has taken the responsibilities of constitutional
deliberation seriously, 57 measured by Supreme Court practice and consistent
with the constitutional oath its members swear.58
5 3 Unlike judicial decisions striking down legislation on constitutional grounds, which
are often said to present "counter-majoritarian" difficulties, BICKEL, supra note 52, at 17-20,
congressional legislation arguably has, by definition, democratic support. Needless to say,
the safer point of view is to limit this to the theory of the system or comparative judgments
grounded in its actual practice. For a classic effort that fills in some of the lines, see Jesse
Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 817-30 (1974).
54 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1959).
55 Deference is already sometimes demonstrated by the Supreme Court through the
constitutional avoidance canon. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490,
500 (1979) (citing Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)) ("[A]n
Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available."); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1957)
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) ("When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is
a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.").
56 This is common enough. Legislative judgments about constitutionality are regularly
based on readings and understandings of the meaning of judge-made constitutional law, or
predictions about what courts will do. See, e.g., Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844, invalidated in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
57Few can forget the sting of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which flyspecked and ultimately deemed constitutionally
inadequate the factual and rational predicate for the Violence Against Women Act, 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), that Congress painstakingly and exhaustively laid out, not only
meeting but exceeding the rules of then-existing Supreme Court precedents. A more recent
example may be the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), invalidated by Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1294 & n.98, 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2011), upheld by Seven-Sky v. Holder,
No. 11-5047, 2011 WL 5378319, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011), and Thomas More Law
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And, truth be told, it is not only those invested in preserving our current
institutional arrangements for considering and deciding constitutional questions
who might be wary of the possibility that the new House Rule could precipitate
these sorts of institutional changes on Capitol Hill. Even those conservatives,59
who, along with a growing number of progressives, 60 have-if for very
different reasons-actively begun imagining a different and diminished role for
courts and a correspondingly increased role for the Congress in our
constitutional system, might greet the prospects of the new House Rule serving
as a vehicle for bringing about some of the more ambitious institutional changes
they seek with feelings that are not unmixed.
Perhaps it is easier to articulate the worry from a progressive perspective,
but to see it, one has to understand what some progressives think may be gained
from what Robin West, with others, has been calling a "legislated
Constitution." 61 At the risk of oversimplification and thus distortion, one
version of the basic notion is that our judicially administered, negative
Constitution is in some sense basically hostile to legislation, seeing it as always
potentially disturbing an equilibrium found in the status quo that is, broadly
speaking, constitutionally imagined to respect freedom. 62 Through the
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), in which Congress expressly found that
the "individual responsibility requirement ... is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce." § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-43.
58U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (oath of office).
59 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80
JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1997) ("Federal judges have strayed far beyond their proper functions
of interpreting and clarifying the law .. "); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 455, 465 (1986) ("A
constitution that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, is no longer a constitution in the
true sense of the term.").
60 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE
L.J. 330, 340 (2006) ("[T]he legislated Constitution, in contrast to the adjudicated
Constitution, is not 'narrowly legal' but rather dynamic, aspirational, and infused with
'national values and commitments."'); id at 341 (Liu "contemplates wide policymaking
discretion for Congress."); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88
MICH. L. REV. 641, 673, 720 (1990) (urging progressives to reorient their constitutional
focus from the courts to the "legislative arena"). See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
61 Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1127, 1163-72 (2006); Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the
Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79, 80 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2009) [hereinafter West, Missing Jurisprudence]; Robin West, Unenumerated
Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 257 (2006); see also, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1338 (2001) ("Congress, not the Court, is
often best situated to make the judgments necessary to create a Constitution of relevance to
Americans today."); Marc Spindelman, Toward a Progressive Perspective on Justice
Ginsburg's Constitution, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (2009).
62 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("It is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
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institutions of judicial review and supremacy, the Constitution has operated as a
power in courts' bands-especially the Supreme Court's-to veto legislative
action it says unconstitutionally threatens freedom by throwing this balance
off.6 3 Within this system, the status quo, unlike legislative change, typically
requires no constitutional justification. Out of bounds within it, and almost
impossible to imagine, is the kind of Constitution-as a vital, living document
"in tune with the times" 64-that progressives and some liberals dream of,
mostly in political theory65: one that is more finely calibrated than the existing
may not enter."); West, Missing Jurisprudence, supra note 61, at 81; see also RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 259-66
(2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett,
Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21,
35-37 (discussing Lawrence's "presumption of liberty"); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally
suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change-to embed
certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away."); id.
at 44 (A "glaring defect of Living Constitutionalism ... [is] its incompatibility with the
whole antievolutionary purpose of a constitution[.].. ").6 3 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 196-97 (1990).
("The Court successfully placed the very structure of government in the category of law and
thus in the domain of the Court.").64 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not
long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.");
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("[W]hen we are dealing with words that also
are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope
that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered
in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) ("[The Constitution is]
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."); Ronald Dworkin, A Special Supplement: The Jurisprudence of Richard
Nixon, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 4, 1972, at 27, 34-35.
65 See, e.g., GOODWIN Liu, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER,
KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2009) ("To be faithful to the Constitution is to
interpret its words and to apply its principles in ways that sustain their vitality over time.");
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010) (arguing the Constitution is a living
document, a "common law constitution"); Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, The
Framers' Constitution: Toward a Theory of Principled Constitutionalism, AM. CONST.
Soc'Y, 2 (Sept. 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone Marshall_-
_TheFramersConstitutionIssueBrief I.pdf ("The principles enshrined in the
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Constitution is to the obligation of the State not only to forbear from acting in
order to protect liberty, equality, and freedom, but also sometimes affirmatively
to take action in order to deliver those goods.66 It is impossible to imagine the
Supreme Court-at least our Supreme Court-administering a Constitution
comprised of this mix of positive and negative rights and their corresponding
positive and negative legislative duties.67 A Congress that attempted to do so,
however, would be an entirely different matter. If the Constitution were less
firmly and finally in judicial hands and more regularly reposed in the
legislature's, it might, just might, become the kind of Constitution that actively
fulfills the obligations, both positive and negative, of a (or the) minimally
decent liberal State.68 Hence the idea, and ideal, of the legislated-as opposed
to the adjudicated--Constitution.
Viewed against this backdrop, the new House Rule, particularly on the
more ambitious reading of it, may wonderfully and productively open up the
possibility of legislative constitutionalism as an actual practice. But,
unfortunately, it looks to do so while carrying within it a considerable amount
of the baggage of our negative Constitution. What concretely drove the new
House Rule into being was a convergence of political philosophies on the
political right variously dedicated to the notion that the government that governs
best, promoting freedom most, legislates least.69 Thus, the progressive concern
Constitution do not change over time. But the application of those principles must evolve as
society changes and as experience informs our understanding."). See generally Charles
Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME
COURT 133 (Stephen Parks Strickland ed., 1967).66 See Marc Spindelman, Death, Dying, and Domination, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1641,
1664-67 (2008); see also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 2271, 2345 (1990); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
503, 544 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 39 (1969);
Jenna McNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law. No Need to Graft,
Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 753, 775-81 (2001).
67 Or at least a full mix of these duties. See generally David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
6 8 See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1901 (2001) (discussing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000)).
6 9 See HENRY D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 109, 109
(Carl Bode ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1849); see also Edmund Jenks, Mitt Romney 2012: A
Company Man in a Field of Mortals, EXAMINER.COM (June 21, 2011),
http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in-los-angeles/mitt-romney-2012-a-company-man-
a-field-of-mortals (noting Mitt Romney's agreement with the attitude); John Tierney, Palin:
'Only a Limited Government Can Provide the Best Path,' KATU.COM (Apr. 23, 2010, 9:38
PM), http://www.katu.com/news/91954624.html (same, but for Sarah Palin). Political
theorists often cited to support Tea Party embracement of this philosophy include LUDWIG
VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 281 (rev. ed. 1963) ("If, however, the government does more
than protect people against violent or fraudulent aggression on the part of anti-social
individuals, it reduces the sphere of the individual's freedom to act beyond the degree to
which it is restricted by praxeological law."), and F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 41-
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with using this Rule as a vehicle for advancing legislative constitutionalism is,
at least in part, that its deep internal logic may not be set to produce the sort of
legislative constitutionalism that progressives would like to bring about, but, if
anything, be set to block it.
Even more practically, it is also the case that the current political climate in
the House that passed this Rule makes the possibility of producing the sort of
legislated Constitution that progressives favor a pipe dream. The constitutional
rules likely to be spawned under the new House Rule, if any are, seem ready to
turn against progressive policies, creating new obstacles to their enactment,
which would need to be faced and overcome before they ever became law.
Progressive possibilities associated with a legislated Constitution that may exist
in theory thus look difficult to achieve in the concrete comprised in the here and
now. At this point, to launch a legislated Constitution predictably means starting
the game with the ball in the progressive end zone.70
Nearly as soon as these concerns come into view, so do others, readily
imagined from other points farther to the right on the political spectrum. These
concerns might train their sights on what might happen to conservative politics
if progressives in Congress, including in the House, were ever able to set the
constitutional rules about what legislation Congress is permitted, as well as
what legislation Congress is duty-bound to pass in order to discharge the
obligations of the liberal State.71 For those who believe that, at least since the
New Deal, the federal government has gotten too big and has been allowed to
get too big by the Supreme Court's unwillingness to keep Congress within its
"true" constitutional bounds,72 the struggle to get Congress to rein itself in and
to develop the constitutional norms by which it might hold itself in check is
already a hugely uphill battle, not least of all for the most ordinary sorts of
42 (50th anniversary ed. 1994) (1944) (arguing for a limited role of government in order to
protect individual rights, particularly economic liberty); see also LUDWIG VON MISES,
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 35 (2009), available at
http://mises.org/books/libertyand_property.pdf ("But the fact remains that government is
repression not freedom. Freedom is to be found only in the sphere in which government does
not interfere. Liberty is always freedom from the government."). As Representative Michele
Bachmann, founder and chairwoman of the House Tea Party Caucus, put it: "1 love von
Mises .... When I go on vacation and I lay on the beach, I bring von Mises." Stephen
Moore, The Weekend Interview with Michele Bachmann: 'On the Beach, I Bring von Mises,'
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2011, at A 1l; see also Kate Zernike, Movement of the Moment Looks
to Long-Ago Texts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A9 (linking ideas current in the Tea Party to
Hayek); The Road to Serfdom, GLENN BECK (June 8, 2010, 11:38 PM),
http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/41653/ (praising Hayek's Road to
Serfdom).
70 Cf West, supra note 60, at 721 ("The key, of course, is to create a progressive
Congress, and behind it a progressive citizenry.").
71 See id.
72 See, e.g., John Samples, Celebrating James Madison, CATO@LIBERTY (Mar. 16,
2011, 3:46 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/celebrating-james-madison. See generally
BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 62; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTrrUTION (2006).
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porkish political reasons. 73 But the climb could be made that much steeper and
more treacherous in all sorts of ways, some predictable, and some less so, if
what is now, formally, permissive welfare legislation were to come to be
regarded as some progressives already sometimes see it: required as a matter of
constitutional obligation.74 Practically speaking, the politics of welfare state
reform, particularly deep reform, notoriously already have this feel.75 But
imagine if so-called political third rails could not, even if touched, be modified
because they are formally constitutional necessities, which must be provided in
order to ensure the minimal conditions of a decent life.76 The legislated
Constitution-if it ever were in progressives' hands-could prove, from this
point of view, to be simultaneously a behemoth and a disaster.
Without taking sides for the moment, the point here is that both
progressives and conservatives who, in theory and principle, are either
committed to or at least amenable to legislative constitutionalism for the reasons
they are, may not, and certainly need not, see the prospect of its actual
achievement-whether by means of the new House Rule or otherwise-with
dewy or starry or forgetful eyes, as the progressives at least are sometimes
accused of doing.77 Nobody wishes to see one's own vision for a just
constitution structurally foreclosed by legislative interpretations of our
73 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S100 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain)
("Given Congress' predilection for unfunded and/or pork barrel spending, omnibus spending
bills, and continuing resolutions, it would seem only prudent and constitutional to provide
the President with functional veto power."); Stephen Moore, Congress Packs More Pork
than Ever in Budget Bill, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at A33.74 West, supra note 60, at 697 ("[Progressives believe] the state has a constitutional
duty to guarantee welfare rights.").
75 Many were reminded of this by the debates surrounding Paul Ryan's Medicare
reform plans, see, e.g., Eli Saslow, In Wis., Conflicted over the GOP Cure, WASH. POST,
Apr. 24, 2011, at A15; Jennifer Steinhauer & Carl Hulse, Voters Attack Republicans on
Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at Al ; Peter Wallsten, GOP Feeling Heat Over Plan
to Overhaul Medicare, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2011, at A10, and more recently, Governor
Rick Perry's description of Social Security as a "Ponzi" scheme, see Michael Cooper &
Nicholas Confessore, Perry's Criticism of Social Security as 'Ponzi Scheme' Dogs Him in
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A18.
76 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944), in
13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: VICTORY AND THE
THRESHOLD OF PEACE 32, 41-2 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950) (proposing a second bill of
rights). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISH4ED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
77 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor
Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1013, 1018-22 (2004) (expressing concern about "the impact
popular constitutionalism could have on civil rights"); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of
Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 673, 678-81
(venturing that "popular constitutionalists focus on the likelihood that other branches of the
federal government will comply with the Constitution" is an "overestimation of compliance
by the other two branches"). See generally Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the
People Themselves and Popular Constitutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 813 (2006).
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Constitution that one's philosophical or political adversaries decide. Even
conservatives, who may momentarily have an upper hand in the House, might
thus think twice before seizing all the opportunities provided by the new House
Rule. Happily, so far, they seem not to have given it very much thought, busy
with other things.
As significant as these dimensions of the larger debate about the legislated
Constitution are, the eventualities they trade in are off at some distance in the
future. Shorter term, there are more pressing concerns to attend. For, as the
conversation about the new House Rule has been proceeding, it is becoming
increasingly clear that congressional insiders are variously signaling that even a
modest interpretation of the new House Rule, such as the one recommended by
the CRS Report, may not be altogether successfully managed without some
meaningful changes to the House's institutional culture. In a public introduction
to the new House Rule, for instance, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor went
out of his way to direct Members of the House to publicly available sources
containing the most rudimentary information about the powers the Constitution
confers upon Congress.78 Similarly, the CRS Report on the new Rule provides
the most fantastic cheat sheet, describing the "constitutional authority for
selected types of proposed legislation," 79 and (if that weren't enough) a "list of
types of legislation and textual authorities." 80 Thinking of a bankruptcy
regulation, Representative? 8' Go to Article I, Section 8, Clause 4.
Appropriations? 82 See Article I, Section 9, Clause 7. Want to punish
78 New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Legislation, ERIc CANTOR: MAJORITY
LEADER, http://www.majorityleader.gov/CAS/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2011); see also Seth
Stem, Back to Bedrock: Republicans Turn to Tea Party's Bare-Bones Constitutionalism as
Key to Reining in FederalAuthority, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 10, 2011, at 110, 117 (Sen. Mike Lee
said he knows "how hard it might be to change the culture of Congress when it comes to
constitutional interpretation and views it as a long-term project." Professor Christopher W.
Schmidt said the Rule "could be clogging up the system, it could be the next time a major
bill is debated on the floor of Congress."); Brittany Baldwin, Top Five Constitutional
Citations of the 112th Congress, FOUNDRY (Feb. 16, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://blog.heritage.org/201 1/02/16/top-five-constitutional-citations-of-the-I 12th-congress
(recording citation patterns for the first month the rule was in use); William A. Niskanen,
Cite the Constitutional Authority or the Lack Thereofi, CATO@LIBERTY (Jan. 20, 2011, 3:12
PM), http://www~cato-at-liberty.org/cite-the-constitutional-authority-or-the-lack-thereof,
Ilya Shapiro, 2011: Year of the Constitution, CATO@LBERTY (Jan. 4, 2011, 9:12 AM),
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/201 1-year-of-the-constitution; Ilya Shapiro, Citing the
Constitution, CATo@LIBERTY (Jan. 5, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/citing-the-constitution ("Congress will actually be debating whether it has the
authority to do something! Kickin' it 19th-century style! The Congressional Record might
now be as interesting reading as the transcripts of Supreme Court arguments, but more so
because the debates there will almost certainly be less abstruse and designed to appeal to
(and satisfy) constituents.").79 THoMAs & TATELMAN, supra note 2, at 4-7.
80 1d. at 7-19.
81Id. at7.
82 Id.
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counterfeiters, Congressman? 83 Check out Article I, Section 8, Clause 6.
Among the most interesting-and painfully telling-sections is the one on Civil
Rights Enforcement that contains a reference to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment legislation and nothing more. 84 For all the other references to it in
the CRS Report, there is no appearance here of the Commerce Clause. 85
No small aside, these predictions about actual practice with the new House
Rule ring right. Although members of the House have geneially been doing a
respectable job with the new House Rule, some of the sources some of them
have been citing as authority for Congress's powers-including the Preamble to
the Constitution,86 the First Amendment, 87 or like it, the Ninth88-suggest that
the schooling in the CRS Report, though rudimentary, could productively fall
on more attentive ears.
More to the point, what all these texts, taken together, suggest is that
members of the House, if not members of Congress more generally, are being
imagined-in important ways or important numbers or both-to lack a certain
fluency in constitutional thinking. This may well be an important dimension of
James Bradley Thayer's predictions about the effects of judicial review on
legislative and political deliberations come true. 89 But whether it is or not, if
83 1d. at 9.
84 1d. at 8.
85 This, in a way, confirms a lesson learned in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
86 See 157 CONG. REC. H1363 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. Kucinich);
id at H5374 (daily ed. July 21, 2011) (statement of Rep. Wolf).
87 See id at H51 1 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2011) (statement of Rep. Deutch); id. at H6139
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 2011) (statement of Rep. Paul).
88 See id. at H3219 (daily ed. May 11, 2011) (statement of Rep. Paul) ("Congress has
the power to enact this legislation [H.R. 1831] pursuant to the following: This act is justified
by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution that, by granting Congress the
power to regulate commerce among the several states, allows Congress to prevent the federal
government from interfering in Americans' ability to grow and process industrial hemp and
by the Ninth Amendment and Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution that
recognizes that rights and powers are retained and reserved by the people and the states.").
89 Thayer observed:
The legislatures are growing accustomed to this distrust, and more and more
readily incline to justify it, and to shed the consideration of constitutional restraints,-
certainly as concerning the exact extent of these restrictions,-turning that subject over
to the courts; and, what is worse, they insensibly fall into a habit of assuming that
whatever they can constitutionally do they may do,-as if honor and fair dealing and
common honesty were not relevant to their inquiries.
The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the legislature;
too often they cheerfully vote for men whom they would not trust with an important
private affair, and when these unfit persons are found to pass foolish and bad laws, and
the courts step in and disregard them, the people are glad that these few wiser
gentlemen on the bench are so ready to protect them against their more immediate
representatives.
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these troubles are being foreshadowed and registered in relation to a modest
interpretation of the new House Rule, one can only imagine how institutionally
ill-suited the House presently would be to satisfy the challenges of a broader
and more ambitious interpretation of it. No matter how much one might like
either in principle or in theory or just on a better reading of Rule's text, given
the impetus for it, to see that interpretation of the Rule be the one the members
of the House abide.
To recognize that there is a constitutional fluency deficit in the U.S. House
of Representatives is not, of course, to say that constitutional conversations in
the House or Congress, more generally, cannot and do not happen, or when they
do, fly as high as constitutional conversations need to go. There are, to begin
and perhaps most obviously, those debates on issues that fall under the general
heading of "political questions" 90 in which Congress is charged with
... Great and, indeed, inestimable as are the advantages in a popular government of this
conservative influence,-the power of the judiciary to disregard unconstitutional
legislation,--it should be remembered that the exercise of it, even when unavoidable, is
always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes
comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably
too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of
moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do that.
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-07 (1901), discussed in BICKEL, supra note
52, at 21-22; see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893) (observing how judicial review
can sap legislative duty of its commitment to constitutionalism and what it requires).
9 0 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); BICKEL, supra note
52, at 184 (outlining foundations of the political-questions doctrine); Alexander M. Bickel,
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46
(1961); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1093, 1105-09 (2001); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question. A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 567 (1966). For constitutional conversations in
Congress generally, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2005); REBECCA
E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (tracing the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment). For an illustration of a legislative constitutional conversation at the
state level, see the floor debate in the Ohio House of Representatives on new voter
identification legislation, Am. Sub. H.B. 194, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011). House
Session-May 18, 2011 (The Ohio Channel television broadcast May 18, 2011), available at
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interpreting and implementing the commands of the Constitution, as it did in the
impeachment and trial of President William J. Clinton. 91 No less importantly
are those debates that, even when not themselves expressly framed as
constitutional deliberations, and one might think here of some of the debates
surrounding the Affordable Care Act92 or the federal partial birth abortion ban
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart,93 may be
constructively understood in those terms.94 As famously in their way, though
not in the House, are the exchanges on fine points in constitutional law that can
and do happen during judicial confirmation hearings in the Senate. Summed up,
it is appropriate to observe that, both historically and contemporaneously, grand
constitutional debates have taken place on Congress's floors.95 These moments
to the contrary notwithstanding, it is also true that in the ordinary course of its
legislative business these days, when Congress considers the constitutionality of
proposed legislation, it is typically less focused on reaching its own considered
judgment about the meaning of the Constitution than on collecting and sorting
through the opinions of outside experts whose focus is typically on predicting
what courts-and in particular the Supreme Court-will make of a particular
piece of legislation, if passed.96 When, that is, Congress engages the
constitutionality of its proposed measures as part of its deliberations at all.
And so it must be recognized that the existence and operation of a
constitutional fluency deficit in the House of Representatives supplies yet
another reason-sounding in what might loosely be described as institutional
culture-that recommends not the broader, but the narrower interpretation of
the new House Rule offered in the CRS Report. Along with the other
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileld=131009, at 39:57; House
Session-June 29, 2011 (The Ohio Channel television broadcast June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ohiochannel.orgiMediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileld=131914, at 180:30.
91 For sources on the Clinton impeachment, see H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (as passed
by House, Dec. 19, 1998) (articles of impeachment against President Clinton); 145 CONG.
REc. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of the Chief Justice) (announcing
acquittal of President Clinton of the charges in the articles of impeachment). For additional
sources on impeachment, more generally, see RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-21 (1973); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK 53-63 (1974), and see also William H. Rehnquist, Political Battles for Judicial
Independence, 50 WASH. L. REv. 835, 836-42 (1975), for a discussion of impeachment as a
congressional mechanism for making "unwritten constitutional law."
92patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
93 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
94David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 925 (1996). See generally Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives' Quest to
Reclaim the Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (2011); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011).
95 See supra notes 57, 90-91.
96 This is partly in the absence of the availability of constitutional advisory opinions
from the courts. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 48-49 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing the constitutional prohibition against advisory opinions).
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considerations to be counted in its favor, the case for this reading of the new
House Rule appears comparatively decisive-for now. The House's
institutional culture, at least at this point in time, does not look to be able to
handle with any high degree of consistency and ease much, if anything, more
than the narrow reading of the Rule the CRS Report provides.
To be sure, this is a current descriptive fact about the House's institutional
culture that must be registered and given heed, not anything to be touted as a
point of pride and ignored. One need not be either a progressive or a
conservative proponent of redistributing constitutional authority away from the
courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, to appreciate this. The present
situation should be taken as reason for concern for anyone who appreciates that
the House of Representatives, as part of Congress, has independent
constitutional responsibilities. But concern or no, changes to the House's
institutional culture are and would be required effectively to sustain a more
ambitious reading of the new House Rule.
Still, this does not quite end the matter. The good news is that the new
House Rule, even on a narrow reading of it, may yet serve to provide members
of the House with practice in openly thinking with and about constitutional
norms in ways that may begin to fill in, and start to cure, the House's
constitutional literacy gap. 97 It is much too soon to tell, but, with time, the new
House Rule might begin to produce just the sorts of changes in congressional
culture that are an institutional precondition for the effective functioning of a
broader understanding of the House Rule, with all the benefits that that could
eventually bring. It is imaginable that, with time, for instance, practice with a
narrow reading of the new House Rule could provide a foundation for a new
sense within the institution (and maybe outside of it), indeed, maybe within
Congress as a whole, that there is both reason and need for its members to
develop deeper and broader understandings of the Constitution and
constitutional interpretation-in the direction of Congress becoming what, in
theory, it already may be seen to be: not only a co-equal branch of the federal
government, but a co-equal interpreter of the federal Constitution, if not more.
Who can say with certainty what might happen along the way or follow as a
result of that? Speculatively: If constitutional interpretation in the House, and
maybe Congress as a whole, started out in its present form, aiming to predict
how courts will exercise their powers of judicial review, a small and subtle-
but important-shift could well be brought about, according to which legislative
deliberation about the Constitution's meaning could become a means by which
legislators sort out for themselves the implications of existing constitutional
doctrines, including those handed down by the Supreme Court. From there, new
methods of constitutional interpretation, different from those that have been
thought to be amenable to use by an unelected judiciary, might begin to emerge.
What might start out as legislative deliberations about constitutional meaning,
97 See BICKEL, supra note 52, at 26 ("[Principled decision making] calls for a habit of
mind, and for undeviating institutional customs.").
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including the meaning of doctrines handed down by the Supreme Court, that
look and sound just like the deliberations that have long been taking place in the
courts, could, over time, cease tracking existing judicial interpretive modes.
Text, history, structure, tradition, precedent, and principled neutrality, along
with other widely accepted sources of constitutional interpretation, all might
well continue to matter, informing legislative judgments about the meaning of
various constitutional provisions. But, in legislative hands, these sources of
judgment could be woven together with reason in all sorts of different ways,
amounting to something new-new styles and forms of acceptable and
persuasive constitutional argument.98 Improvements in constitutional literacy in
the House and perhaps Congress, as a whole, might, in other words, produce an
importantly, if not also an entirely, new language of and for constitutional
deliberation. 99
To notice these possibilities-and they are, of course, for the moment only
that-is not necessarily to make an affirmative argument for the development of
new interpretive methodologies as part of a practice of legislative
constitutionalism. At least not yet. Rather, what it is, is an invitation to
recognize and imagine what sorts of constitutional reforms, at the level of
constitutional method, could be in the offing in the wake of practice with the
new House Rule.
Far short of these possibilities, for now, the new House Rule, even on the
narrow interpretation of it found in the CRS Report and the weight of actual
practice with it in the House, may be recognized as doing something that may
prove to be quite significant. Through engagement with the Constitution and
constitutional deliberation of the sort that the new House Rule calls for,
members of the House may come to share, whatever their political affiliations, a
political desire for full fluency and literacy in constitutional deliberation and
debate. Following and flowering from that desire could well come a desire to
change the institutional culture of the House, and the wider political culture,
which has for so long left the Constitution so firmly and finally in the hands of
the courts. In saying this, it is important not to confuse a desire for change with
change itself. Institutional change-particularly changing an institution's
culture-is notoriously hard.' 00 Existing institutional cultures, particularly of
98 For a delightful example of what these methods could look like, see Adrienne D.
Davis, Slavery as Gender Supremacy: Reflections on Justice Ginsburg's Jurisprudence and
a Contemporary Theory of Reproductive Rights (Apr. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
99 Intersecting these ideas is A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana, Foreword, Towards a Theory of
Legislative Argument, 4 LEGISPRUDENCE 3 (2010); Jan Sieckmann, Legislative
Argumentation and Democratic Legitimation, 4 LEGISPRUDENCE 69 (2010).
0 Useful points are found in Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and
Development, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 511 (2009); Mark Tushnet, Some Observations on
Legislative Capacity in Constitutional Interpretation, 2 LEGISPRUDENCE 163 (2008).
Additional pertinent discussion is in Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, Progressive
Constitutionalism and Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1083 (2011).
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institutions with scales like the House of Representatives, are extraordinarily
complex, and altered, when they are, often only slowly and against the
gravitational force of inertia and well-settled ways of doing business, and only
in the presence of tremendous dedication and effort and consensus. 10 1 Even
preconditions like broad consensus, when they exist, are not always enough to
get the job done. And, in any case, quite significantly, the House of
Representatives is not anywhere near that point where the sorts of changes that
would accompany the House playing a larger and more significant role in
constitutional interpretation are possible because wanted. All of this, then, is
really only to say what one can: The new House Rule is a sign, but only a small
sign, of the chance for change. It puts on display a sense that the House, and
maybe Congress as a whole, could and should be taking the Constitution and
constitutional interpretation much more seriously than it has been in recent
years. If only dimly, it suggests the prospects of-and, importantly, a
mechanism or an occasion for-re-imagining constitutional dialogue being
conducted with the courts. If the desires behind it are attended to, not ignored,
not snuffed out, but joined, and joined across the political board, the prospects
could be small or they could be stunningly big. The new House Rule, on a
modest interpretation of it, one that the House is already attempting to handle
today, might turn out, in the course of time, with the right recognition of what it
could be aiming toward, to have yielded a new future and a new course for the
Constitution and our country that proponents of the measure might not have
expected, but which, if and when these eventualities transpire, they should be
justly proud for helping to have brought about.
101 And not only that, but coordination with the remainder of the Congress, and some
perhaps also with the other branches, see Conrado H. Mendes, Neither Dialogue Nor Last
Word: Deliberative Separation of Powers 111, 5 LEGISPRUDENCE 1 (2011), and support in
political culture writ large, as well.
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